ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: VIOLENCE AND BELONGING: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP LAW ON VIOLENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Anne Christine Frugé, Doctor of Philosophy, 2017

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Many countries in Africa are embroiled in heated debates over who belongs where. Sometimes insider/outsider debates lead to localized skirmishes, but other times they turn into minor conflict or even war. How do we explain this variation in violence intensity? Deviating from traditional explanations regarding democratization, political or economic inequality, or natural resources, I examine how nationality laws shape patterns in violence.

Citizenship rules determine who is or is not a member of the national political community. Nationality laws formalize these rules, thus representing the legal bond between individuals and the state. Restrictive nationality laws increase marginalization, which fuels competition between citizenship regime winners and losers. This competition

stokes contentious insider/outsider narratives that guide ethnic mobilization along the dual logics of threat and opportunity. Threats reduce resource levels and obstruct the exercise of rights. Opportunities provide the chance to reclaim lost resources or clarify nationality status.

Other work explains conditions necessary for insider/outsider violence to break out or escalate from the local to the national level. I show that this violence intensifies as laws become more exclusive and escalates to war once an outsider group with contested foreign origins faces denationalization. Groups have contested foreign origins where the “outsider” label conflates internal and foreign migrants. Where outsiders are primarily in-migrants, it is harder to deny the group’s right to citizenship, so nationality laws do not come under threat and insider/outsider violence remains constrained to minor conflict.

Using an original dataset of Africa’s nationality laws since 1989, I find that event frequency and fatality rates increase as laws become more restrictive. Through case studies, I explain when citizenship struggles should remain localized, or escalate to minor or major conflict. Next, I apply a nationality law lens to individual level conflict processes. With Afrobarometer survey data, I show that difficulty obtaining identity papers is positively correlated with the fear and use political violence. I also find that susceptibility to contentious narratives is positively associated with using violence to achieve political goals. Finally, I describe the lingering effects of a violent politics of belonging using original survey data from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.

VIOLENCE AND BELONGING: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP LAW ON VIOLENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

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Chapter 8. In The Days After: Evidence from Field Surveys in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

Citizenship regimes structure the politics of belonging in a country. The nationality law lens not only helps us understand conflict processes at the individual level; it is also relevant to understanding post-conflict settings. Specifically, it can illuminate the lingering effects of a violent politics of belonging. I test Hypothesis 5 in this chapter:

> *H5: A history of politicized citizenship debates increases popular support for using political violence, even after conflict has ended.*

To test this hypothesis, I turn to field surveys I conducted in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana in 2014. Recall that Ivorian citizenship is a politicized and contentious issue, but Ghana has historically had a stable and inclusionary citizenship regime.[137] My contention here is that Ghana serves as the counterfactual for Côte d'Ivoire; a baseline for what Ivoirians attitudes should look like had Côte d'Ivoire not suffered a VOB war. I find that risk factors in violent mobilization remain high in Côte d'Ivoire, whereas there are few predictors of support for violence in Ghana. My results demonstrate that VOB produces long-term effects on social cohesion, and that the risk of violence relapse remains elevated despite progress towards reconciliation.

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[137] See Chapters 5 and 6 for case studies of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

The survey results also reveal a certain puzzle. From certain angles, it seems that Hypothesis 5 is not in fact borne out. Over the last six years, the Ivoirian government has seen progress in peace-building efforts. For instance, international audiences cheered as incumbent Alassane Ouattara won re-election in 2015 without a return to violence. Furthermore, an experiment I embedded in the 2014 questionnaires shows that support for ethnically-biased distribution is about 13 percentage points higher in Ghana than in Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, support for ethnically-inclusive distribution is about 11 percentage points lower in Ghana.[138]

[138] The differences in support levels are statistically significant at conventional levels with p-values of 0.00 and 0.01, respectively. See "Research Design" below for details on the survey procedures.



Figure 22: Resource distribution preferences, by country

Alongside these encouraging signs, I find that Côte d'Ivoire's path to peace remains incomplete and fragile. Popular support for using violence to achieve political goals is higher in Côte d'Ivoire, and Ivoirians willing to mobilize are more tolerant of political violence than Ghanaians. Furthermore, although Ivoirians outwardly express a stronger preference for ethnic inclusion, ethnic cleavages retain their potent link with violence in Côte d'Ivoire but not in Ghana. I contend that the stark contrast here is indicative of the lingering effects of VOB. However, the patterns I unearth say more than that violence begets violence. Indeed, they speak to the nature of divisions that persist in Ivoirian society, and therefore the types of cleavages along which future cycles of violence may erupt. It is no coincidence that ethnic cleavages, which previously catapulted debates over Ivoirian

citizenship onto the national stage and down the path to war, continue to have a strong association with support for violence. We also learn from the surveys that political entrepreneurs face a conducive recruitment environment. Ethnicity remains a salient cleavage in society and individuals willing to mobilize are also more tolerant of using violence to achieve political goals.

In the following sections I detail the methodology of my field surveys and embedded experiment, present an empirical analysis of Hypothesis 5, and discuss alternative explanations. I conclude by reflecting on what these findings mean for the future of Ivoirian peace-building and for post-VOB countries more generally.

Research design

Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are appropriate cases for this comparison because they are similar along important structural dimensions related to geography, demographics, and development, but their divergent nation-building processes and citizenship regimes produced vastly different outcomes in terms of the politics of belonging. The conflict processes active in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are detailed in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, respectively, but it is worth summarizing them here as well. Côte d'Ivoire offered expansive citizenship rights under first-president Houphouët Boigny. After 1993, nationalist principles grounded citizenship in autochthony, leading to the denationalization of many northerners (collectively referred to as "Dioula"). From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, violence in Côte d'Ivoire progressed from protests to civil war in response to the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law. Citizenship in Ghana is not politicized because formal and informal institutions are generally geared towards national integration of all ethnic groups. Ghana's pluralistic nation-building model has

weakened ethnic barriers and helped to build a unified national identity. Communal violence has remained localized through most of Ghana's history.

To study political attitudes in each country, I conducted field surveys in Abidjan and Accra from November to December 2014. The sampling procedure was not intended to produce a nationally representative sample, but, as the metropolitan centers of their respective countries, Abidjan and Accra offer diverse subject pools. Survey sites were selected using a multistage sampling procedure tailored to the specific municipal structure of the city.[139] In Abidjan, 7 communes (districts) were randomly selected, followed by 4 localities (neighborhoods) within each commune. In all, 23 neighborhoods were surveyed in Abidjan. In Accra, a sample of 21 localities were selected from a population of 103, all of which were included in the final sample. Within each locality, subjects were selected using a clustered random sample stratified by gender. Enumerators began at a focal point in each locality and used a "random walk" to select every fourth household.[140] In total, 841 surveys were completed. Survey questions are cited throughout this discussion as "FS" followed by the question number (i.e. FS-15). A list of original survey questions is available in Table 24 in the appendix.

[139] Differences between Abidjan and Accra in terms of municipal structure and ease of mobility necessitated sampling procedures tailored to the local context. Surveys could not be completed in all the randomly-selected neighborhoods of Abidjan due to unforeseen issues that arose during the field research, including inclement weather, security concerns of the enumerators, and logistical constraints.

[140] Within each household, one respondent was interviewed. If multiple people were in the household, enumerators used randomized cards to select a participant over the age of 18.

I embedded an experiment in the questionnaire to evaluate attitudes regarding resource distribution by local officials. Surveys and experiments are common measurement tools for individual-level factors, such as support for political actors or policy (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero 2014; Wantchekon 2003) or perception of state institutions (Gutiérrez-Romero 2014). Enumerators administered three versions of the survey, each of which had slightly different phrasing of the following prompt:

> **FS-15:** Now I'm going to give you some information about aid distribution and then I'll ask for your opinion. An aid organization has given a community leader a little money by to buy grain for families in the community. He only has enough money to buy grain for 50 households even though most families in the community need the grain.

The "Ethnic-Bias" treatment group learned that the leader distributed grain to members of his ethnic group only. The "Ethnic-Inclusion" treatment group heard that the leader distributed grain to at least one household from each ethnic group. The control group learned that the leader randomly distributed grain to households. Participants were then asked whether the method described was an acceptable way to distribute the grain.

In summary, the present analysis employs a most-similar research design. Ghana's questionnaires thus indicate what attitudes should look like in the absence of a politicized citizenship regime. In other words, Ghanaian responses are a proxy for what Ivoirian attitudes would look like today had VOB not happened. Outcomes in Côte d'Ivoire should generalize to other post-VOB settings because Ivoirian politics of belonging have followed a familiar trajectory seen elsewhere on the continent.

Table 5 presents summary statistics demonstrating that the treatment groups did not differ statistically from the control group.[141] None of the p-values reach statistical significance, suggesting that randomization effectively created balance between the groups. The treatment and control groups comprised both Ivoirians and Ghanaians. In the analysis I separate the treatment effects by country to understand how *Citizenship Regime* affects outcomes.

[Insert Table 5]

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[141] Columns 1-3 list the mean of demographic characteristics by group, Columns 4 and 6 list the differences between the means of the treatment and control groups. Columns 5 and 7 state the p-value of the test that the difference between the respective treatment and control group is zero.

Table 5: Balance test

	1 Bias (T1)	**2** Inclusion (T2)	**3** Control (C)	**4** Difference (T1-C)	**5** P-Value (T1-C)	**6** Difference (T2-C)	**7** P-Value (T2-C)
Age	45.095	44.297	44.964	0.131	0.989	-0.666	0.938
Gender	0.498	0.491	0.837	-0.339	0.339	-0.346	0.334
Education	6.565	6.993	6.971	-0.406	0.446	0.022	0.973
Religion	2.807	4.556	3.964	-1.157	0.408	0.592	0.710
Employed	2.940	1.652	1.650	1.291	0.241	0.003	0.998
Wealth	3.758	3.975	3.466	0.292	0.569	0.509	0.344

A model for risk assessment

The following section covers variables under study in this chapter: support for political violence, ethnic cleavages, and mobilization feasibility. These indicators are operationalized through survey questions.

Dependent variable

To gauge levels of popular tolerance of political violence, the variable *Support* dichotomizes responses to FS-11. This question asks about the legitimacy of political violence. I code *Support* as "1" for individuals who agree that "it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause."[142]

This binary dependent variable paints a clear picture of attitudes, yet comes with some drawbacks. First, violence occurs in a moment and it is understandably difficult for individuals to predict what they would do in very specific circumstances. That said, Ivoirians may make better predictions given that they recently went through a conflict. Secondly, FS-11 is potentially affected by social desirability bias, which is inherent in sensitive survey questions. I attempt to address this problem by providing respondents some distance from the act of violence. For example, I do not ask participants if they committed or would commit violence. Instead, I ask them whether such an act is *ever* justified. Taking this softer approach allows the respondent to safely express opinions that may run up against social norms. I still expect the distribution of responses to this question

[142] Other possible responses (*Support*=0) are: The use of violence is never justified in politics (, Agree with neither, Don't know, and No response.

to underestimate true preferences in the population. The fact that coefficients achieve statistical significance in spite of such bias builds confidence in the results. So too does the expectation that social desirability should affect Ghanaian responses to the same extent (possibly even more), which would level out *Support*'s downward-bias.

Overall, 20% of respondents agree that violence is justified in certain circumstances, while half believe it is never justified. Figure 23 displays the distribution across all possible responses to FS-11. I find that Ghanaians are much less supportive of political violence (13.4%) than Ivoirians (27.9%).[143] A chi-square test shows that Ivoirian levels of *Support* differ significantly (p=0.00) from those of Ghanaians.

[143] These values correspond to those found in the Afrobarometer data, in which 12.4% of Ghanaians (2014) said violence was justified in politics and 22.1% of Ivoirians (2013) agreed.



Figure 23: Support for violence, by country

Let us turn now to the independent variables of the analysis. With the understanding that violence occurs in a moment, I evaluate risk factors shown in the literature to be capable of transforming *support* for violence into *action*. I look specifically at the role of ethnic cleavages and mobilization around political entrepreneurs, which made a deep mark on the Ivoirian civil war. I measure ethnic cleavages as the salience of ethnic identification relative to national identification (*Ethnic Salience*), and the perception that the government favors co-ethnics in resource distribution (*Ethnic Bias*). *Ethnic Salience* is a categorical variable based on FS-8:

> **FS-8:** Let's suppose that you had to choose between being a [National Identity] and being a [Self-reported Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?

I code *Ethnic Salience* as “3” when an individual identifies more strongly with their nationality than with their ethnicity, and as “1” if the reverse is true.[144] I code the variable as “2” if a respondent expresses equal attachment to ethnic and national identity.

Winner/loser mobilization typically follows ethnic lines, so measuring the strength of attachment to ethnic identity is important to this study. I do not mean to suggest that strong ethnic attachments are necessarily violence-prone. Rather, they represent a potential cleavage along which individuals may mobilize. Ethnicity-based mobilization has been found in the literature to intensify outcomes (Eck 2009). An additional benefit of *Ethnic Salience* is that it allows me to interrogate attitudes towards violence held by individuals who feel greater attachment to their *national identity*. This angle is too often overlooked in the politics of belonging literature. Given that outsiders often push for a liberal citizenship emphasizing a polity unified around the national character, violence of belonging may reflect a nationalist goal. The Ivoirian case is testament to this fact.

Overall, 23% of respondents favor their ethnic identity and 30% favor their national identity. Figure 24 breaks down responses by *Ethnic Salience* categories and by country. I find that the distribution of identity salience differs significantly (p=0.00) between Ivoirians and Ghanaians, but in ways that may surprise. Ethnic and national identification is actually twice as high in Ghana (at 30% and 40%, respectively) as in Côte d’Ivoire (at 15% and 19%, respectively). Ivoirians tend to report equal attachment (60%). This result could be driven by a number of forces beyond the scope of this project: social desirability,

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[144] People who identified “more” or “only” with a particular identity were collapsed into the same category (*Ethnic Salience*=1 or 3). Other possible responses include: Don’t know (*Ethnic Salience*=0) and No response (*Ethnic Salience*=0).

response to a traumatic experience pitting ethnic and national identity against one another, etc. Through multivariate analysis, I demonstrate that group identification maintains a positive relationship with tolerance of violence in Côte d'Ivoire, but not in Ghana.



Figure 24: Relative ethnic salience, by country

Based on FS-9, *Ethnic Bias* captures perceptions about resource distribution by the government.

FS-9: In your community, who receives goods and services from the government?

I code *Ethnic Bias* as "1" if a respondent perceives ethnic bias in the distribution of state resources and as "2" if he or she perceives a bias towards people who helped get the

ruling party elected (henceforth referred to as “clients”).[145] In the Ivoirian Civil War, the perception of biased resource distribution by the government (particularly their favoritism towards migrants) encouraged citizenship regime “losers” to mobilize. *Ethnic Bias* speaks to the salience of this risk factor in Ivoirian politics today. It is possible that there is substantial overlap between co-ethnics of the regime and their supporters. However, given that respondents have the clear option to report ethnic bias specifically, I am confident that the two answers capture different sentiments. The distribution of responses supports this assumption.

Overall, 23% of respondents believe leaders favor their co-ethnics, but many people (43%) report no bias. Figure 25 breaks down responses by *Ethnic Bias* categories and by country. The difference in perceptions between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire is highly significant (p=0.00), likely driven by sharp differences in the *type* of perceived government bias. I find that roughly three times as many Ivoirians report *ethnic* bias as Ghanaians (36% and 11%, respectively), and that three times as many Ghanianas report *client* bias as Ivoirians (25% and 9%, respectively).

[145] Other possible responses include: No bias, meaning no perception of patronage (*Ethnic Bias*=3), Don't know (*Ethnic Bias*=0), and No response (*Ethnic Bias*=0).



Figure 25: Biased resource distribution, by country

The last factor I investigate is mobilization feasibility, which concerns leaders' ability to rally supporters around a cause. It is based on FS-10:

> **FS-10:** If you disagree with something the government is doing and one of the following individuals calls on you to join them and their supporters in working to solve the problem, how likely are you to agree?

Elections are so central to escalation processes during the politics of belonging that violence is often related to mobilization by politicians specifically. *Feasibility* thus takes a value of “2” if someone is “likely” or “very likely” to follow a political party leader when

protesting government policy.[146] As a robustness check, I look at other types of leadership to capture different mobilization patterns: local government officials and traditional leaders.

One strength of *Feasibility* is that the variable reflects an understanding that violence occurs in a moment. In a time of crisis or upheaval, charismatic leaders can bring latent tensions to the surface or even cultivate new preferences. Therefore, a risk assessment of violence relapse must not only consider attitudes towards violence as a political tool or the salience of ethnic cleavages, but also towards the likelihood of collective action. The next step, which I do in short order, is to determine whether mobilization will lead to communal fighting.

The inevitable caveat for *Feasibility* is that I do not mean to suggest that all collective action in Côte d'Ivoire necessarily turns violent. I also recognize that the question is framed broadly enough to capture non-violent and violent protest. For these reasons, it is important to study the relationship between *Feasibility* and other risk factors. Concern arises when individuals willing to mobilize are *also* more tolerant of violent action. I find this to be the case in Côte d'Ivoire.

Overall, 54% of respondents are willing to follow political party leaders, 52% are willing to follow local government officials, and 63% are willing to follow traditional leaders. As shown in Figure 26, Ghanaians and Ivoirians are similarly likely to follow leadership with some significance in the distribution of responses (p=0.067).

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[146] Other possible responses are: Unlikely to follow (*Feasibility*=1), Don't know (*Feasibility*=0), and No response (*Feasibility*=0).



Figure 26: Mobilization feasibility, by country

Control variables

My analysis of Afrobarometer data from Chapter Chapter 7 showed how important it is to control for the effect of political grievance. I treat grievance as a control rather than an explanatory variable because its effect on conflict onset is still debated in the literature. In addition, ethnic grievance is an alternative explanation to the factors presently identified.[147] Based on FS-6, I code *Grievance* as "1" if the respondent believes their ethnic group to be politically worse or much worse off than other groups in society.[148] In a robustness check I do not collapse the original categories of FS-6, instead allowing *Grievance* to reflect the full variation in responses.[149]

> **FS-6:** Think about the present condition of [R's Ethnic Group]. How would you rate the condition of [R's Ethnic Group] compared to other ethnic groups in the country in terms of political influence?

About 28% of all respondents feel marginalized to some extent. Interestingly, I find that only 16% of Ivoirians feel their ethnic group fares better than other groups in society, compared to 37% of Ghanaians. The level of grievance differs significantly ($p=0.00$) between the two countries. Figure 27 displays the distribution across all possible responses to FS-6.

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[147] See Chapter Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the treatment of political grievance in the literature.

[148] Other possible responses are: Similar (*Grievance*=2), Better (*Grievance*=3), Much better (*Grievance*=3), Don't know (*Grievance*=0), and No response (*Grievance*=0).

[149] The categories of *Grievance* in grievance-robust models are as follows: Much better (*Grievance*=5), Better (*Grievance*=4), Similar (*Grievance*=3), Worse (*Grievance*=2), Much Worse (*Grievance*=1), Don't know (*Grievance*=0), and No response (*Grievance*=0).



Figure 27: Political grievance, by country

I include standard demographic controls of age, gender, ethnicity, employment, education, religion, and residence in a rural or urban area in all empirical models. These variables are established factors in mobilization, political grievance, and violent onset. *Ethnicity* is operationalized as the respondent's family language and *Employment* is a binary indicator for whether an individual is employed. A control for household wealth is purposively excluded given high collinearity between wealth (measured as self-reported, personal economic conditions) and *Grievance*. Models rely on unpooled data. Those using the Ivoirian sample include a control for whether the respondent lives in a stronghold of

Ouattara (RDR party) or Gbagbo (FPI party).[150] Detailed summary statistics of all control variables are available in Table 25 in the appendix.

Empirical Analysis

The previous section demonstrated that tolerance of political violence is higher in Côte d'Ivoire than in Ghana. This section takes the analysis a step further to study correlates of that tolerance. I find that ethnic cleavages and willingness to rally around leadership, two triggers of conflict processes, are positively and significantly related to *Support* in Côte d'Ivoire and not in Ghana. In fact, only client-based distribution has a consistently positive and significant relationship with *Support* among Ghanaians. The implication is that ethnicity remains a potent cleavage in Côte d'Ivoire that can be leveraged by political entrepreneurs. Further, I show that collective action under the guidance of entrepreneurs is violence-prone. A similar situation is less likely in Ghana. After presenting the results, I address several alternative explanations.

The models are a series of logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered on neighborhood (*Locality*) using unpooled survey data. I factor out categorical variables to determine the effect of each category on the outcome of interest. Figure 28 displays the effects of key variables from the main model, with estimates presented as odds ratios.[151] The full regression results, including those from feasibility-robust models (controlling for

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[150] See Chapter 4 for details about Ivoirian leadership and political party allegiances.
[151] Recall that odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients of a logistic regression. They describe differences between two populations in terms of order of magnitude.

other leadership types) and grievance-robust models (disaggregating *Grievance*), are available in Tables 26 and 27 in the appendix.[152]



Figure 28: Correlates of support for political violence

I find that leadership has a strong and positive correlation with *Support* in Côte d'Ivoire. Individuals willing to rally behind political party leaders, government officials, and traditional leaders are more tolerant of political violence (Models 4-6e and 4-6f), as compared to their less-than-willing counterparts. Specifically, those Ivoirians willing to mobilize around a political party leader are 3.32 times more likely to support political violence than those who are not willing to mobilize. Ghanaians willing to do the same are 1.8 times more likely as their less-motivated counterparts (Model 1e). However, the

[152] The coefficients are not exponentiated in these tables.

coefficient on *Feasibility* loses its statistical significance in Ghana's feasibility-robust models (Models 2-3e and 2-3f, respectively). Smaller coefficients and inconsistent significance indicates a weak relationship between mobilization and support for violence in Ghana.

In support of Hypothesis 5, ethnic cleavages predict *Support* in Côte d'Ivoire in spite of the reported ethnic tolerance there (Models 4-6e and 4-6f). Those who believe that government agents favor their co-ethnics are about three times more likely to support political violence than those who do not perceive a bias. Additionally, those who identify more strongly in ethnic terms are around 1.63 times more likely to support violence than those who identify equally with their ethnic and national identities. Interestingly, Ivoirians who identify more strongly in national terms are about twice as likely to support violence, reinforcing the idea that VOB can be instigated by those favoring national integration. The literature has not paid much attention to this strand of VOB so it would be a productive avenue for future research.

Furthermore, ethnic cleavages are not predictive of *Support* in Ghana (Models 1-3e and 1-3f), which is in line with my prediction. I find that ethnic bias and ethnic identification do not significantly affect tolerance of violence among Ghanaians. However, Ghanaians who perceive *client* bias in the government are three times more likely to support political violence, as compared to those who perceive no bias. In contrast, client bias has a much weaker relationship with *Support* among Ivoirians. In Côte d'Ivoire (Models 5-6e and 5-6f), the coefficient regarding client bias is half the size as in Ghana (Models 1-3e and 1-3f) and only somewhat significant.

The effect of political marginalization is hard to determine in the models. *Grievance* has a negative and somewhat significant ($p<0.1$) effect on *Support* in Ghana, but no significant effect in Côte d'Ivoire in the main models (Models 1-6e). In grievance-robust models (Models 1-6f), the coefficient on *Grievance* fails to achieve significance in almost every model in the Ghana sample, and has only a weak relationship with *Support* in the Côte d'Ivoire sample. The coefficients in Models 1-6f are finicky. They gain and lose significance depending on the model specification. Some of the contradictory results can be attributed to low-observation counts in the categories "much worse" (N=72) or "much better" (N=60). This fact justifies my decision to collapse *Grievance* into four categories in the primary analysis. At the same time, these results are a microcosm of the ongoing debate in the literature about how to understand the effect of grievance. Marginalization clearly has a nuanced relationship with political violence, and specifying this relationship may be beyond the scope of this present study.

Finally, I find that individuals in President Ouattara's (RDR) strongholds are less supportive of using political violence than individuals in former-President Gbagbo's (FPI) strongholds. This result likely stems from the fact that RDR supporters were the primary victims of Ivoirité and VOB preceding the war. Furthermore, they are now in power with the head of their party in the presidential office, and violence would surely threaten their position.

Alternatives

One source of potential bias stems from the pressure some respondents may feel to answer questions in a socially desirable way. This problem plagues any questionnaire broaching sensitive subjects, such as ethnic relations and political violence. I try to

minimize the effect of this bias in two ways. First, I compare two countries with strong social norms against ethnic discrimination. I expect that social desirability would affect Ghanaian responses to the same or greater extent as Ivoirian responses, thus levelling out any downward-bias caused by social desirability. Granted, norm-development evolved in different ways in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. However, the underlying process of norm-development is endogenous to the independent variable of interest here (*Citizenship Regime*). In fact, the norm-development processes are possible causal mechanisms driving differences in Ivoirian and Ghanaian attitudes. Secondly, surveys were conducted in private so that respondents could speak their minds away from friends or family members. Lastly, I designed the questionnaire such that respondents did not have to openly admit to engaging in "negative" behavior. For example, I ask whether violence is *ever justified*, rather than whether respondents *have used* violence themselves. When the questionnaire asks directly about a sensitive topic, such as ethnically-biased resource distribution, I use an experimental design. I can therefore compare responses to the sensitive question with responses to neutral (random distribution) or pro-social (ethnically-inclusive) questions. Finding statistically significant results, even if the estimates of true preferences are conservative measures, increases confidence in the results.

A second concern with the chosen testing procedure may be that Côte d'Ivoire suffered a civil war from 2002 to 2007, with a brief resumption of fighting in 2010. This recent unrest has surely impacted individual attitudes towards mobilization, leadership, grievances, and violence. However, rather than undermining my results, the Ivoirian conflict is part and parcel of the key independent variable, *Citizenship Regime.* Struggles over contested citizenship, and nativist ideology in particular, characterize politics in Côte

d'Ivoire during the multi-party era. The civil war was a response to Côte d'Ivoire's increasingly exclusionary citizenship regime. The violence further politicized citizenship debates, thereby reinforcing the contrast exploited in my testing. There is no way to disentangle the risk factors explored here from an individual's experience with the war. Instead, this chapter emphasizes what we can glean from the data, which is that exclusionary citizenship regimes increase the salience of risk factors in violence even after conflict has ended. I leave it to future research to explain how much of the results are driven by experience of past conflict.

Discussion

Many of the preceding chapters have investigated collective violence in the aggregate. Chapter 4 linked nationality law and annual events and fatalities, while Chapters 5 and 6 examined group level processes and mechanisms. To fully understand collective behavior, it is important to identify micro-level determinants and then link all levels of analysis. I use survey data in Chapters 7 and Chapter 8 to explore individual-level determinants of political violence. I aim to shed light on the foundations of VOB. The findings have implications for determining the likelihood of conflict relapse.

Ethnic entrepreneurs on both sides of the citizenship debate in Côte d'Ivoire preyed upon ethnic divisions, effectively tearing the country in two. Today, the recruitment environment for Ivoirian political entrepreneurs remains rife with opportunity and collective action is violence-prone. I find not only that ethnic cleavages are salient in in Côte d'Ivoire, but that they are strongly associated with support for political violence. Furthermore, I show that individuals willing to mobilize around leadership are more tolerant of violence, as compared to other individuals.

The consequence is that Côte d'Ivoire's path to peace, roundly cheered after the 2015 election, is incomplete and fragile. Serious threats to stability and reconciliation remain, an observation that has sobering implications for other post-citizenship-conflict societies. This is not to say that Côte d'Ivoire is on the upswing of a conflict trap. Rather, I suggest that there is still work to do. The positive steps towards peaceful elections and continued economic development are encouraging. However, if the root causes of Côte d'Ivoire's VOB are not fully resolved, they remain potent even after fighting has died down. A concern for Côte d'Ivoire moving forward is that the fundamental question of land ownership has not been settled. Lessons from Ghana on managing disputes, and de-politicizing citizenship issues in particular, may serve Côte d'Ivoire well in the long-run.

Chapter 9. A Path for Citizenship Studies

Where should the boundaries of the Nation lie? Who is an insider? Who is an outsider? These profoundly contentious questions form the core of the politics of belonging. Citizenship represents the legal bond between an individual and the state. Citizenship rules, formalized through nationality law, determine who has a claim to the most important rights in the polity: the right to vote, stand for office, own property, obtain a passport, etc. Debating who *does* or does *not* have a right to citizenship can lead to violence because citizens "own" the state.

Previous scholarship explains why citizenship debates so often turn into armed confrontations. The role of land or election mechanisms, often framed as insider/outsider competition, receive much attention from analysts. Far less energy is directed to the role of exclusive nationality laws, much less the cross-national variation in VOB intensity. And yet variation within nationality laws produces notably different levels of violence. This gap in our knowledge leads to the question, why is insider/outsider violence worse in some places than others? I argue that the answer lies in the legal framework of belonging itself. Specifically, codifying exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law intensifies VOB. Moreover, I identify a new causal factor in civil war: the threat to denationalize an outsider group.

Starting from the premise that citizenship politics is a form of redistributive conflict producing *winners* and *losers*, I argue that exclusive nationality laws increases competition between these groups. Furthermore, the marginalization produced by exclusive laws creates incentives to challenge status quo citizenship rules. Winner/loser competition

follows ethnic lines, and thus encourages the development of contentious citizenship narratives about where outsiders belong. These narratives justify a preferred pattern of resource distribution and frame status quo citizenship rules as *threats* and *opportunities*. The ethnically-exclusive appeals inherent in these narratives build group cohesion, reinforce an ethnic security dilemma, and facilitate armed organization.

The literature is fairly clear on factors in VOB onset: political competition between insiders and outsiders, politicization of land and ethnicity, and economic or political crisis. In contrast, I focus attention on the underexplored question of variation in VOB intensity. Why is it that citizenship debates lead to localized skirmishes in some countries, but minor conflict or even war in others? Restrictive laws deepen marginalization and exacerbate insider/outsider tensions. Contentious narratives emphasize deep group cleavages, which facilitates ethnic mobilization and thus intensifies the severity of VOB outcomes. When outsiders are labelled foreigners because the group is composed of internal and external migrants, calls to strip them of citizenship rights gain traction. Once a group faces denationalization, they have few options outside of extra-institutional strategies to defend their rights. Consequently, armed confrontations are more likely to devolve into a civil war. However, events remain constrained at the level of minor conflict where outsiders do not have contested foreign origins, which happens where outsiders are primarily in-migrants.

My research makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, the conflict studies field is intensely interested in how exclusion from power, resource competition, or ethnic rivalries drive conflict processes. And yet citizenship, the fundamental instrument of inclusion and access, is largely overlooked. I find that provisions in nationality laws have explanatory power in their own right, and not just in

the well-worn cases of extreme violence sparked by competitive elections. While the existing literature recognizes that citizenship policy has far-reaching effects, it has not made much headway in understanding how specific provisions impact violence outcomes. Situated in the burgeoning scholarship on Africa's citizenship policies, this dissertation offers a fresh vantage point for the citizenship politics field. For instance, the African Citizenship Policy Index's (ACPI) flexible framework expands the breadth of legal provisions to be studied, and proposes a means of systematizing and coordinating overlapping research agendas. In addition, by employing violence severity as an outcome of interest, I endeavor to correct the selection bias towards extreme cases (e.g. conflict events and election violence) currently weighing on the field.

Secondly, previous work tends to assign groups to opposite ends of the insider/outsider dichotomy and study their interactions. In contrast, I conceptualize groups as aggregations of individuals that fall along a spectrum of citizenship security. This approach is novel in the way it emphasizes how *threats* to citizenship rights and *opportunities* for improved status guide violent collective action. In deviating from the traditional focus on ethnic identity and grievance, the concept of citizenship security provides a new perspective on why contentious narratives lead to VOB and how elites are able to convince supporters to follow them. Furthermore, examining the insider/outsider dichotomy as a citizenship regime winner/loser divide sheds a different light on elite-individual interactions. This approach implicates elites *and* individuals from insider *and* outsider groups in the joint production of violence. Therefore, it offers novel insight into group relations, and how group composition interacts with nationality law.

In terms of empirical contributions, I identify new factors and trends never before observed by taking a broadly comparative approach. I find that event frequency and fatality rates generally rise as laws become more exclusionary, and that laws have a larger effect on fatality rates. Looking at individual level data, which is under-utilized in existing VOB studies, I show that people who have difficulty obtaining national identity papers are more likely to fear and use political violence. Individuals susceptible to contentious citizenship narratives are more likely to use political violence, but not to fear it. Access to national identity documents and susceptibility to contentious narratives are significant factors and independent of ethnic grievance. These findings are important because the correlation between these factors and VOB is acknowledged in the literature, but not statistically modeled. Moreover, studies to date are unclear on how to evaluate their relative weight, as compared to the effect of other VOB forces.

The ACPI is one of my most important empirical contributions. Data limitations have hampered the development of generalizable metrics relevant to citizenship politics. Without indicators permitting systematic comparisons across countries and time periods, it is extremely challenging to determine the extent to which nationality laws explain geographic or temporal variation in outcomes of interest. The relationship between citizenship policy and patterns in political violence remains under-explored because existing work has not produced a comprehensive, cross-national indicator. I created the ACPI to help remedy this major constraint on research into citizenship law. Employing a country-year unit of analysis, the ACPI is the first quantitative metric for studying Africa's legal framework of belonging. Capturing the most salient policy dimensions (e.g. birthright, gender, ethnicity, naturalization, and dual nationality), the index generalizes to

almost any region of the world. The ACPI builds on dedicated efforts of other scholars and complements existing research by enlarging the scope of variation under observation. An additional benefit is that the ACPI moves the field towards developing standardized indicators to facilitate replication and consensus. Tracking ACPI scores over time yields an encouraging trendline: citizenship policies in Africa are becoming more inclusionary. At the same time, ACPI analysis demonstrates the close relationship between exclusive nationality laws and violence severity.

In summary, a comparative study of nationality laws helps explains a wider range of outcomes, from localized skirmishes to civil war, in a wide range of time periods, both during and outside of election periods than what has come before. Furthermore, close attention to the interaction of elite interests and individual motivation fills in details about how contentious narratives transform individual preferences into action at the group level. Finally, case studies demonstrate that events are more likely to escalate into war when denationalization becomes a bargaining chip in citizenship debates.

The policy implications of this project are clear: minimize exclusion through citizenship law to reduce marginalization and violence. This is not to say that nationality law is a panacea for security issues in Africa or elsewhere, but inclusionary citizenship policies are more than lofty goals to be included in human rights treaties. They must be established and enforced through constitutions and peace agreements. They are a means of strengthening state institutions and augmenting the government's legitimacy, which serve the twin goals of achieving stability and increasing development.

Historical circumstances set many countries in Africa on a trajectory of acute and often violent citizenship debates: a period of repressive colonization, weak institutions

designed for extractive purposes, complicated and extensive migration flows, deep ethnic fractures and history of conflict along group lines, forced democratization in the context of fragile political institutions and vulnerable economic structures. These conditions are not a favorable groundwork for stable or peaceful politics, much less for delicate issues surrounding belonging and identity. The evolution of citizenship law in Africa is therefore illustrative of the processes and mechanisms that transform the *politics* of belonging into *violence* of belonging.

However, African experiences are not singular events and nativism. Demonization of the Other arises in places as disparate as Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the former Soviet Bloc, and Western Europe (Geschiere 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2015). The proliferation of this obsession can be explained by the ordinariness of the conditions that propel citizenship debates towards violence. Many parts of the developing world are still recovering from their colonial past. Pressures amplified by globalization, such as massive migration flows and economic and political liberalization are not confined to a single continent or development level. Additionally, a truism of sorts is emerging in global politics: Economic and political instability at the national level generate profound existential insecurity at the individual level, which leads to scapegoating foreigners for a bounty of misfortunes. These trends may be magnified in African states, but they are still apparent almost anywhere else. Consequently, lessons from this dissertation apply beyond the Continent's boundaries. While not universal *per se*, they tell us a great deal about the meaningfulness of membership in the contemporary moment. We can draw out their implications for Nations in states and political development generally.

Similarly, dire prognoses about the future of the nation-state as an organizing principle in the international system may be overblown. Christian Lund's observation that "the *idea* of the state is, if not entirely clear, quite powerful despite the incapacity of government institutions" is apropos (2003, 589). Continued confrontations over citizenship criteria indicate that the nation-state remains a powerful, if only symbolic, organizing force. In fact, a "new nationalism" (Ake 1996; Kersting 2009) spreading around the globe espouses indigeneity as the essential criterion for membership in the political community. Further, it suggests the swelling popularity of having nation-homogenous states. Legislation should therefore be closely monitored for nativist (or proto-nativist) strands because inclusionary policies are jeopardized by such movements.

As the fundamental tool of inclusion and exclusion from rights resources in the polity, citizenship laws have the potential to consolidate or undermine democracy. I have detailed the various ways leaders in Africa have manipulated nationality laws as part of divide and rule politics. However, it would be a mistake to containerize this research as only relevant to multi-ethnic societies democratizing in the modern era. For instance, charismatic populist leaders espousing xenophobic nationalism are largely responsible for the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the growing number of parliamentary seats in Europe held by far-right parties, and the success of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election in the United States.[153]

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[153] On the Brexit vote, see: Goodwin and Heath (2016) and Inglehart and Norris (2016). On the rise of far-right parties in Europe, see: Norris (2005), Mudde (2007), Goodwin (2011), or Inglehart and Norris (2016). On far-right ideology in the U.S. presidential campaign of 2016, see: Philip Klinkner, "The easiest way to guess if someone supports Trump? Ask if Obama is a Muslim,"

Preferences for exclusionary citizenship rules at the local level are poised to upend inclusionary policies at the national level, paralleling the cases of Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya. As competition between winners and losers under the prevailing regime has intensified in Western Europe, some elites have turned to exclusionary national identity discourses and contentious citizenship narratives to push for more restrictive citizenship rules. Calls to close borders in Finland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, [154] or to build walls in Austria, Hungary, and the United States reflect ongoing citizenship debates in these countries. [155] Furthermore, legislation in the U.S. to tighten voter identification requirements and calls to eliminate *jus soli* citizenship rights represent efforts to shrink the boundaries of the national community.[156] The "long, hot" summers of "urban rebellion"

Vox.com, June 2, 2016. http://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11833548/donald-trump-support-race-religion-economy (Accessed September 28, 2016).

[154] Finland's nationalist Finns Party wants to block immigration from non-European Union countries: Jan Sundberg, "Who are the nationalist Finns Party?" *BBC.com*, May 11, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32627013 (Accessed September 28, 2016). Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are clamping down on the number of migrants crossing their borders: WSJ. "Europe's Closing Borders," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 7, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-closing-borders-1452212006 (Accessed September 28, 2016).

[155] Austria plans to build a wall on its border with Slovenia and Italy: Simon Tomlinson, "Is Austria building a fence on the border with Italy?" *DailMail.com*, April 12, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3535936/EU-concerned-Austria-planning-build-fence-border-Italy.html (Accessed September 28, 2016). Hungary built fences on its southern border with Serbia and Croatia in 2015, then announced expansion plans in 2016: Associated Press, "Hungary's PM plans 'more massive' fence to keep out migrants," *The Guardian*, August 26, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/hungarys-pm-plans-more-massive-fence-to-keep-out-migrants (Accessed September 28, 2016). On the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall, see: "Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again". *DonaldJTrump.com*. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/immigration-reform (Accessed September 28, 2016).

[156] On voter ID laws, see: Brennan Center for Justice, "New Voting Restrictions in Place for 2016 Presidential Election," *Brennan Center*, at http://www.brennancenter.org/voting-restrictions-first-time-2016 (Accessed September 28, 2016). On ending birthright citizenship, see: Tal Kopan,

during the American civil rights movement (McLaughlin 2014), and their latest reincarnation as protests over discriminatory policing, serve as reminders that while largescale violence is unlikely, restrictive citizenship rules can be destabilizing even in strong states.

Where do we go from here? The challenge is to pursue meaningful reforms that encourage buy-in from stakeholders and avoid creating a regressive backlash that undermines the entire project. The latest return to nativism stands in stark contrast with the integrationist vision that characterizes the 20th century. From the League of Nations to organizations bent on regional unification to an embrace of Multiculturalism, the trajectory of citizenship policy, while halting at times, has generally inclined towards greater tolerance and deeper integration. Since the establishment of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, all international human rights treaties uphold the principle that every person has a right to a nationality. The difficulty, of course, is bringing domestic policy into line with international norms. The African Union (AU) has taken positive steps in this direction by seeking to formalize the right to a nationality, which is implied but not explicitly granted by Article 6 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. As of August 2015, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Right adopted a draft Protocol to the African Charter

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"Birthright citizenship: Can Donald Trump change the Constitution?" *CNN.com*, August 18, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/politics/birthright-citizenship-trump-constitution/ and Jenna Johnson, "Scott Walker: The U.S. should 'absolutely' stop granting birthright citizenship," *The Washington Post*, August 17, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/08/17/scott-walker-the-u-s-should-absolutely-stop-granting-birthright-citizenship/

on the Right to a Nationality. In July 2016, the AU allowed the draft to "enter the procedures for elaboration of legal instruments for adoption by the African Union" (CRAI 2016). If the Protocol is passed, it places additional pressure on governments to change nationality and naturalization laws to make them more inclusive.[157]

An entire overhaul of domestic nationality law is, of course, unlikely in the vast majority of cases. Instead, incremental changes are the surest way to improve citizenship policies.[158] First, there should be a pathway to citizenship for individuals born in the territory and for long-term residents. This pathway should not be narrow or characterized by discretionary judgement on the part of officials; it should fight against conditions leading to permanent exclusion. Secondly, citizenship rules should not only be widely inclusive, but also objective, specific, clear, and transparent. Otherwise, competing claims to nationality will continue to subvert social cohesion, political stability, and democratic consolidation. The position of insiders and outsiders is similarly undermined by vague or contradictory nationality laws. The adoption, implementation, and enforcement of just laws requires strong state institutions. Finally, the legitimacy of nationality laws depends upon the legitimacy of the state and its institutions; this point should not be forgotten.

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[157] More information on international and African standards for citizenship laws is available through the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative at http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/.
[158] Manby (2015, Chapter 15) details opportunities for reform and principles that should be respected throughout the process.

Table 24: Original Field Survey Questions

Dependent Variable Questions

FS-11
Question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Values: 3= It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause, 2= The use of violence is never justified in politics, 1=Agree with neither, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into binary variable

Independent Variable Questions

FS-8
Question: Let's suppose that you had to choose between being a Ghanaian and being a [*Group from Q5*]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?
Values: 5=Only national identification, 4=More national identification, 3= Equal attachment to ethnic and national identity, 2=more ethnic identification, 1=only ethnic identification, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable

FS-9
Question: In your community, who receives goods and services from the government?
Values: 3= Everyone, 2= Only people who helped get the ruling party elected, 1= Only members of the ruling party's ethnic group, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable

FS-10
Question: If you disagree with something the government is doing and one of the following individuals [A leader of the political party that you support, Local government officials, Religious, or traditional leaders] calls on you to join them and their supporters in working to solve the problem, how likely are you to agree?
Values: 3=Very likely, 2=Likely, 1=Not at all likely, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable

Control Variable Questions

Interviewer's gender

Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing
Note: Answered by interviewer

FS-1
Question: How old are you?
Values: 18-84, 777=Refused to answer, 999=Don't know

FS-4
Question: Which language do you speak at home? That is, the language of your group of origin.
Values: Abbey, Abidji, Aboure, Abron, Adjoukrou, Agni, Ahanta, Ahizi, Akan, Alladjan, Appolo, Attie, Avikam, Bakoue, Bambara, Baoule, Bete, Boussanga/Burkina, Bulsa, Dagaare, Dagaati, Dagbani, Dagomba, Dida, Djimini, Dogo, Ebrie, Ehotile, English, Ewe, Fafara, Fanti, Francais, Ga/Dangbe, Gagou, Gnamboua, Godie, Gonja, Gouro, Guan, Guere, Hausa, Kotokoli, Koulango, Koyaka, Krobo, Kroumen, Kusasi, Lobi, M'Batta, Malinke/Dioula, Mamprusi, Mole/Burkina, More, Mossi/Burkina, N'Gbato, Narie, Neo, Ningo, Nzema, Odienneka, Senoufo, Sisaala, Siya, Toura, Wobe, Yacouba, Yorey, Other [Specify].

FS-6
Question: Think about the present condition of [Group from Q4]. How would you rate the political influence of [Group from Q4] compared to other ethnic groups in the country?
Values: 5=Much Better, 4=Better, 3=Same, 2=Worse, 1=Much worse, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable

FS-18
Question: Interviewer's highest level of education
Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only, 2=Some primary school, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary/high school, 5=High school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University, completed, 9=Post graduate, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable

FS-19
Question: What is your religion, if any?
Values: Christianity, Islam, Traditional/ethnic religion, Atheist (don't believe in God), Agnostic (don't know if there is a God), Other (Specify), Don't know, Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable

FS-20
Question: What is your occupation? Please only specify the main one
Values: Open-ended
Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable

Experimental Groups

FS-15
Question: Now I'm going to give you some information about aid distribution and then I'll ask for your opinion. An aid organization has given a community leader a little money by to buy grain for families in the community. He only has enough money to buy grain for 50 households even though most families in the community need the grain. [Read T1, T2, or C]. Is this an acceptable way to distribute the grain?

T1: He decides to give grain to members of his ethnic group (family/cultural group) only.

T2: He decides to make sure that at least one household from each ethnic group (tribe, cultural group) in the community gets some grain.

C: He decides to give grain to 50 households at random.

Values: 1=Yes, 0=No, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer

Table 25: Descriptive Statistics, Field Surveys

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Percent
Support for violence	841	0.203	0.403	0	1	
Follow political party leader	841	1.503	0.576	0	2	
Other (political party)	34					4.04
Unlikely to follow (political party)	350					41.62
Likely to follow (political party)	247					29.37
Very likely to follow (political party)††	210					24.97
Follow government official	841	1.476	0.575	0	2	
Other (government official)	34					4.04
Unlikely to follow (government official)	373					44.35
Likely to follow (government official)	249					29.61
Very likely to follow (government official)††	185					22.00
Follow traditional leader	841	1.595	0.551	0	2	
Other (follow traditional leader)	26					3.09
Unlikely to follow (traditional leader)	289					34.36
Likely to follow (traditional leader)	275					32.70
Very likely to follow (traditional leader)††	251					29.85
Group political conditions	839	7.422	18.188	1	99	
Much Worse (political conditions)††	72					8.58
Worse (political conditions)	160					19.07
Same (political conditions)	333					39.69
Better (political conditions)	166					19.79
Much Better (political conditions)††	60					7.15
Other (political conditions)	48					5.72
Resource distribution	841	1.870	1.147	0	3	
Other (resource distribution)	140					16.65
Ethnic bias	194					23.07

Client bias	142					16.88
No bias	365					43.4
Ethnic/National identification	841	1.979	0.848	0	3	
Other (identification)	39					4.64
Only ethnic (identification)††	63					7.49
More ethnic (identification)	53					6.30
Equal (identification)	499					59.33
More national (identification)	58					6.90
Only national (identification)††	143					17.00
Education	841	2.232	0.839	0	4	
Other (education)	3					0.36
Primary school or less	130					15.46
High school or less	459					54.58
Some post-H.S.	167					19.86
University or Graduate school	82					9.75
Religion	841	1.837	0.684	0	4	
Other (religion)	30					3.57
Islam	165					19.62
Christianity	579					68.85
Traditional or Other religion	46					5.47
Atheist or Agnostic	21					2.5
Employed	841	1.496	0.559	0	2	
Other (employed)	26					3.09
No	372					44.23
Yes	443					52.68
Sex	840	0.607	3.435	0	99	
Men	428					50.95
Women	411					48.93
No response (sex)	1					0.12
Age	841	44.787	105.464	1	84	

No response (age)	10					1.19
Language	841	11.541	9.371	0	30	
Locality	841	19.794	9.539	1	32	

Notes: The symbol †† indicates that this category is collapsed into an existing category for the primary analysis

Table 26: Predicting Support for Violence, Main Model

	Ghana			Côte d'Ivoire		
	(1e)	(2e)	(3e)	(4e)	(5e)	(6e)
Unlikely to follow political party	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Likely to follow political party	0.597**			1.201***		
	(0.263)			(0.237)		
Other (follow political party)	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Unlikely to follow traditional leader		0.000			0.000	
		(.)			(.)	
Likely to follow traditional leader		0.371			0.645***	
		(0.277)			(0.191)	
Other (follow traditional leader)		-0.208			0.000	
		(1.199)			(.)	
Unlikely to follow gov't official			0.000			0.000
			(.)			(.)
Likely to follow gov't official			0.255			0.581**
			(0.285)			(0.207)
Other (follow gov't official)			0.000			-0.579
			(.)			(0.396)
Worse political conditions	-0.669**	-0.631*	-0.569*	-0.583	-0.472	-0.514
	(0.322)	(0.329)	(0.319)	(0.493)	(0.502)	(0.513)
Similar political conditions	0.124	0.105	0.170	0.356	0.401	0.347
	(0.290)	(0.287)	(0.279)	(0.393)	(0.323)	(0.358)
Better political conditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Other (political conditions)	0.978**	0.877**	0.850**	1.128**	0.911**	0.609
	(0.424)	(0.383)	(0.395)	(0.469)	(0.427)	(0.443)
Ethnic bias	0.658	0.580	0.579	1.177***	1.056***	1.143***

	(0.545)	(0.507)	(0.497)	(0.261)	(0.256)	(0.259)
Client bias	1.223**	1.108**	1.086**	0.491	0.567*	0.588*
	(0.431)	(0.375)	(0.402)	(0.357)	(0.313)	(0.323)
No bias	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Other (bias)	0.978**	0.877**	0.850**	1.128**	0.911**	0.609
	(0.424)	(0.383)	(0.395)	(0.469)	(0.427)	(0.443)
More/Only ethnic identification	0.600	0.488	0.513	0.487**	0.375*	0.372*
	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.441)	(0.202)	(0.215)	(0.193)
Equal identification	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
More/Only national identification	0.228	0.210	0.199	0.733**	0.668*	0.657*
	(0.326)	(0.316)	(0.310)	(0.356)	(0.380)	(0.362)
Other (identification)	0.099	0.010	0.111	-0.819	-0.772	-0.891
	(0.843)	(0.862)	(0.812)	(0.633)	(0.652)	(0.617)
Education Level	-0.267*	-0.281**	-0.280**	-0.006	0.005	0.030
	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.180)
Religion	-0.175	-0.195	-0.173	-0.112	-0.093	-0.136
	(0.239)	(0.248)	(0.243)	(0.186)	(0.161)	(0.171)
Employed	-0.113	-0.050	-0.072	0.007	0.052	0.093
	(0.318)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.176)	(0.156)	(0.197)
Men	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Women	0.137	0.146	0.155	-0.554**	-0.546**	-0.550**
	(0.267)	(0.271)	(0.268)	(0.253)	(0.215)	(0.212)
Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnicity	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005	0.064**	0.061**	0.065**
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
RDR stronghold				-0.714**	-0.633**	-0.619**
				(0.261)	(0.299)	(0.292)
Constant	-1.732*	-1.599*	-1.458	-2.383**	-2.145**	-2.159**

	(1.000)	(0.938)	(0.902)	(0.958)	(0.835)	(0.959)
Observations	426	438	427	374	379	395

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 27: Predicting Support for Violence, Grievance-Robust Model

	Ghana			Côte d'Ivoire		
	(1f)	(2f)	(3f)	(4f)	(5f)	(6f)
Unlikely to follow political party	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Likely to follow political party	0.610**			1.214***		
	(0.266)			(0.199)		
Other response (political party)	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Unlikely to follow traditional leader		0.000			0.572**	
		(.)			(0.190)	
Likely to follow traditional leader		0.411			0.000	
		(0.284)			(.)	
Other response (traditional leader)		-0.241			-0.684*	
		(1.192)			(0.399)	
Unlikely to follow gov't official			0.000			0.000
			(.)			(.)
Likely to follow gov't official			0.272			0.682***
			(0.291)			(0.171)
Other response (gov't official)			0.000			0.000
			(.)			(.)
Much worse political conditions	-1.102	-1.161	-1.070	-0.871	-1.016**	-0.986**
	(0.736)	(0.730)	(0.717)	(0.532)	(0.466)	(0.472)
Worse political conditions	-0.640*	-0.587	-0.512	-1.060*	-0.937	-0.967
	(0.371)	(0.391)	(0.380)	(0.618)	(0.588)	(0.617)
Similar political conditions	0.044	0.011	0.097	-0.035	-0.061	-0.094
	(0.303)	(0.305)	(0.291)	(0.395)	(0.320)	(0.344)
Better political conditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Much better political conditions	-0.405	-0.458	-0.379	-1.227**	-1.473**	-1.370**

	(0.569)	(0.562)	(0.562)	(0.599)	(0.649)	(0.636)
Don't know (political)	-0.561	-0.552	-0.564	0.366	0.102	-0.073
	(0.795)	(0.799)	(0.799)	(1.159)	(1.038)	(1.001)
No response (political)	0.000	0.000	0.000	-1.387	-1.007	-1.198
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.991)	(1.226)	(1.105)
Ethnic bias	0.658	0.581	0.576	1.243***	1.136***	1.216***
	(0.559)	(0.530)	(0.515)	(0.284)	(0.267)	(0.267)
Client bias	1.221**	1.117**	1.082**	0.531	0.619*	0.649*
	(0.432)	(0.380)	(0.402)	(0.371)	(0.349)	(0.335)
No bias	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Other response (bias)	0.965**	0.877**	0.842**	1.263**	1.067**	0.746*
	(0.419)	(0.380)	(0.389)	(0.442)	(0.363)	(0.419)
More/Only ethnic identification	0.631	0.528	0.552	0.488**	0.395*	0.376*
	(0.440)	(0.439)	(0.426)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.204)
Equal identification	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
More/Only national identification	0.242	0.227	0.213	0.616*	0.548	0.532
	(0.325)	(0.318)	(0.312)	(0.366)	(0.393)	(0.367)
Other response (identification)	-0.264*	-0.277*	-0.279**	0.020	0.032	0.052
	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.161)
Education Level	-0.182	-0.206	-0.182	-0.095	-0.085	-0.139
	(0.245)	(0.255)	(0.248)	(0.184)	(0.161)	(0.171)
Religion	-0.117	-0.061	-0.083	-0.001	0.060	0.099
	(0.320)	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.208)	(0.188)	(0.224)
Employed	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Men	0.136	0.144	0.156	-0.532**	-0.551**	-0.557**
	(0.272)	(0.279)	(0.276)	(0.222)	(0.205)	(0.201)
Women	0.631	0.528	0.552	0.488**	0.395*	0.376*
	(0.440)	(0.439)	(0.426)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.204)
Age	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	0.000	0.000	-0.000

	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnicity	-0.004	-0.007	-0.006	0.070**	0.066**	0.070**
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.030)
RDR stronghold				-0.639**	-0.575**	-0.561**
				(0.257)	(0.285)	(0.275)
Constant	-1.722*	-1.602	-1.432	-2.649**	-2.412**	-2.354**
	(1.040)	(0.993)	(0.950)	(0.949)	(0.802)	(0.958)
Observations	425	437	426	372	377	393

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001